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CHAPTER 17 
Creating a Culture for Leading and 
Performing in the Extreme 
Donald H. Horner Jr., Luann P. Pannell. and Dennis W. Yates 
Inside the Surge: When Judgment Blurs and Cultures Collide 
By early 2008 in the Iraq War, the positive effects of the U.S. "surge" had 
started to become visible in the streets of Baghdad, as shops began to 
reopen and people again filled the streets.1 Despite these outwardly posi-
tive appearances, a sinister undercurrent flowed through the population. 
Rumors ran rampant in Iraqi military and government circles that the radi-
cal cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army was about to launch an offensive 
against the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a fellow Shiite, 
because of Sadr's unhappiness with his waning political influence. 
In the neighborhood of Zafaraniyah, in Baghdad's southeastern quad-
rant, Sadrist fighters started to make trouble. The unit responsible for 
Zafaraniyah had been trained by its commander to act with a great deal of 
restraint in order to avoid unnecessary civilian deaths. This was in keeping 
with guidance issued by General David Petraeus, commanding general of 
the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. The success or failure of Petraeus' strategy 
of limiting civilian deaths depended solely on the support of the Iraqi peo-
ple and their perceptions of American and Iraqi forces. What Petraeus was 
attempting to do on a large scale was to change the organizational culture 
of both forces. The events of February and March 2008 would put Petraeus' 
vision and strategy to the test and offer evidence of what happens when 
old ways of doing business compete with the new. 
On the second night of what would come to be called "the upris-
ing," a fight erupted between a dozen young Sadrist fighters and a pla-
toon of American and Iraqi soldiers in the most troubled neighborhood in 
Zafaraniyah. The engaged platoon was well trained, had the situation well 
in hand, and acted with restraint. What unfolded was a textbook example 
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of the tendency of higher headquarters to use available technological inno-
vations regardless of the logic (or illogic) of doing so and in contravention 
of a subordinate commander's wishes. 
The battalion watch officer, or "battle captain," ran from the tactical 
operations center (TOC) to the battalion commander's office to notify him 
of the firefight. The battle captain explained that the brigade headquarters 
wanted to drop a SOD-pound bomb from an F/A-18 Super Hornet onto the 
house where it was believed that twelve or so fighters had gone to make 
a last stand. The brigade TOe was watching the house from several miles 
away via a live camera feed from an aerial drone. 
Rushing to the TOe the battalion commander attempted to call off the 
strike. "For God's sake-our job here is to protect the Iraqi people! It's the 
first sentence in our f--g mission statement! And you want to drop a 
damned bomb on someone's house?!" 
Every soldier in the TOe broke eye contact. They knew they were 
wrong. Their error: they got caught up in viewing the action as nothing 
more than a video game. They failed to assess whether dropping a bomb 
on an Iraqi house was consistent with the commander's intent to exercise 
restraint and minimize civilian casualties. 
Within minutes, the battalion commander was on his way to the scene 
of the fighting to assess the situation. Almost immediately, he heard the 
boom of a Hellfire missile striking its target to the east of the commander's 
location, followed by the staccato report of a string of 30mm shells from 
the helicopter's main gun. Several minutes later, the commander found 
the platoon. The two small units and the Iraqi soldiers began fighting their 
way deep into the neighborhood to find the target house. It appeared 
that the missile strike had taken the spirit out of the enemy fighters, and 
friendly forces surrounded the house. They found surprisingly little dam-
age. Fortunately, the Apache helicopter had fired a newly developed mis-
sile, specifically designed to limit destruction in urban terrain. Nonetheless, 
there was still collateral damage to other houses and pools of blood on the 
ground, along with bloody Iraqi National Police uniforms. 
T his all-too-real story illustrates what happens when judgment blurs and cultures collide. Despite a battalion commanders best efforts 
to comply with a general order to protect Iraqis, well-intentioned, 
but detached, soldiers ordered an air strike that effectively bombed 
an Iraqi home and generated unnecessary collateral damage. The incompat-
ible, video game-like world of a Toe encroached upon the soldier-on-the-
ground culture that sought to build positive perceptions and relationships 
among the local population. The established Army culture-to identify and 
target an enemy with all available weaponry despite potentially deleterious 
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effects to the local civilian population-trumped the new guidance and intent 
of General Petraeus and subordinate commanders. 
This chapter examines methods of creating a culture for leading and per-
forming in extreme environments. A theoretical framework is provided to help 
in understanding what culture is and what culture does and to offer insight 
into why it is so difficult to change a culture. The chapter combines a military 
view of culture with a police department's perspective to provide a broad sense 
of what culture means for organizations operating in extreme environments. 
CULTURE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The structural-functional school of anthropology and sociology is an appropri-
ate point of departure for a discussion about creating an organizational culture 
expected to perform in in extremis contexts. The notion of culture as a struc-
tural element of society was introduced by Polish anthropologist Stanislaw 
Malinowski in his ethnographic research on tribes in the southwest Pacific 
islands, Africa, and elsewhere. Malinowski views culture as a collective system 
of shared habits and emphasized the functionality and utility of these hab-
its for society. This functional view of culture "lays down the principle that in 
every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills 
some vital function."2 
Though Malinowski's contemporary, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown rejects the 
structural-functional view as tautological, he highlights that the relational 
aspects of culture help form bonds of kinship that extend beyond family, mar-
riage, or blood into groups or teams through which blood kinship is meta-
phorical.3 Radcliffe-Brown argues that culture can be created, learned, and 
transmitted in meaningful ways within groups, teams, and organizations. The 
American sociologist Talcott Parsons acknowledges this distinction and notes 
that "culture is intrinsically transmissible from one action system to another 
by learning and diffusion."4 From a leadership perspective, this would be good 
news because it suggests that once identified, the proper culture for function-
ing in dangerous contexts can be replicated, taught, and reinforced. Another 
implication is that cultures can be adjusted and changed. 
Parsons goes on to argue that culture creation and transmission are 
essential tasks required of all social systems.5 In Parsonian terms, " [11 he prob-
lem of creating, preserving, and transmitting the system's distinctive culture 
and values"is an issue of survival for the social system.6 The American indus-
trialist Chester 1. Barnard went a step further, arguing that transmission of a 
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company's culture and values is an essential leadership task. Barnard views 
the creation, maintenance, and transmission of culture as a primary function 
of the chief executive."The distinguishing mark of the executive responsibil-
ity is that it requires not merely conformance to a complex code of morals but 
also the creation of a moral code for others. The most generally recognized 
aspect of this function is called securing, creating, inspiring of 'morale' in an 
organization. This is the process of inculcating points of view, fundamental 
attitudes, loyalties, to the organization or cooperative system, and to the sys-
tem of objective authority."? 
Barnard asserts that it is a meaningful pattern of relationships within an 
organization-the culture-that creates"a condition of communion and the 
opportunity for commandership."s Embedded in this framework are the ele-
ments of esprit de corps and elan indicative of high-performing teams and 
organizations operating in extreme environments. Barnard's Functions of the 
Executive is foundational to conceptions linking leadership with organiza-
tional culture. 
Tom Peters and Robert Waterman's In Search of Excellence extend the view 
of culture from something that an organization has to something that an orga-
nization is. Linda Smircich agrees, noting that initial usages described cul-
ture as "an attribute or quality internal to the group ... and a fairly stable set 
of taken-for-granted assumptions, shared beliefs, meanings, and values that 
form the backdrop for action."9 In this way, organizations actually take on 
the identity of the cultures they espouse, becoming part myth, part legend, 
and part reality. Peters and Waterman note that companies become identified 
with their cultures and contend that "excellent companies are marked by very 
strong cultures, so strong that you either buy into their norms or get OUt."lO 
Edgar Schein's Organizational Culture and Leadership offers a relevant and 
useful conception of culture for leaders and teams performing in extreme 
environmentsY Schein's views are appealing because they operationalize, 
or make concrete, many of the variables implicit in earlier theoretical for-
mulations. Schein's conception is a derivation of the structural-functional 
approaches blended with insights garnered from years as an organizational 
scholar. Schein defines culture as a"pattern of shared basic assumptions that 
the group [or team or organizationllearned as it solved its problems of exter-
nal adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."12 
Schein's definition is densely packed. His theory notes that culture is rela-
tional, learned, transmitted, patterned, and perception based. It also suggests 
that most people in an organization presume the culture to sanction certain 
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perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors based on a past history of prob-
lem solving within the organization and with outsiders. At the risk of dis-
torting Schein's views, a simpler definition is offered here to demystify the 
concept: Culture refers to a basic pattern of assumptions, norms, behaviors, 
and values learned by members of a group or organization as the proper way 
to think and behave and includes a general sense of "how things work" in the 
group or organization. In plain language, culture refers to "how things are 
done" by an organization and "what matters" to an organization. This defini-
tion of culture serves as the basis for the discussion here. 
Schein proposes that there are three levels of culture within an organiza-
tion. "Levels" refers to "the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is vis-
ible to the observer."13 The distinction between levels is significant because 
it implies that (1) not all elements of culture are readily discernable and (2) 
there can be matches and mismatches between levels-meaning that one can 
encounter mixed cultural signals at various levels of the organization. Figure 
17.1 depicts the three levels of culture. 
The easiest level to observe are artifacts, which are" all the phenomena 
that one sees, hears, and feels"when encountering a group or organization.14 
Artifacts appeal to the senses and include such elements as the physical plant 
OBSERVABLE 
NOT 
OBSERVABLE 
NORMS 81 VALUES 
OBSERVABLE 
NOT 
OBSERVABLE 
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
FIGURE 17.1 Schein's three levels of culture 
Source: Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong, and Charles D. Allen,"Organizational Culture: Applying a Hybrid 
Model to the U.S. Army" (unpublished working paper, U.S. Army War College, 2008), based on Edgar H. 
Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992). 
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and environs, language, colors, attire, signage, behavioral interactions, sto-
ries, myths, legends, ceremonies, and the like. Artifacts are what visitors and 
new employees most immediately notice when dealing with the organization. 
Artifacts are, however, but one aspect of culture, providing only a hint of what 
the organization mayor may not actually value. The degree to which arti-
facts "reflect deeper values in the minds of organization members" is uncov-
ered only after having spent a good deal of time observing or working in 
the organization.15 
At the next level are espoused values or norms and values.16 They are 
deeper, less readily observable aspects of culture than artifacts. Norms and 
values are transmitted to members of the group through learning, practice, 
and assimilation. Values are judgments about what is important in an organi-
zation, while norms represent unwritten rules that allow members of a culture 
to know what is expected of them in various situations. What one values will 
affect what one perceives as "normal"behavior in an organization. Values and 
beliefs define the organization, are a mechanism for social control, and also 
influence identity development. 
Those who best embody, transmit, and propagate norms and values to 
other members of the group become recognized as leaders. Because of this, 
Schein argues that "culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin."17 
By this he means that leaders create and reinforce culture, and culture deter-
mines the criteria for who advances in an organization. The transformation 
of members from value and norm conformists to norm and value instructors 
is cognitively significant because it represents a shift from "must" to "ought." 
Assessing the degree to which all members of the group or organization buy-
in to norms and values provides some sense of the cohesiveness and strength 
of the culture. For example, the story opening this chapter illustrates how dif-
ficult it was for Army leaders to get subordinates to buy in to the new culture 
that valued restraint and protection of the Iraqi people instead of the heavy-
handed application of advanced weaponry. 
The most difficult level of culture to discern, and yet the most important, 
is basic underlying assumptions. Paradoxically, basic underlying assumptions 
are hard to decipher because they are so fundamental and taken for granted. 
Schein notes, "When a solution to a problem works repeatedly, it becomes 
taken for granted. What was once a hypothesis, supported only by a hunch 
or value, comes gradually to be treated as reality. We come to believe that ... 
things work this way."lS 
Basic underlying assumptions are similar to what Chris Argyris calls 
"theories-in-use." Argyris explains that"human beings have programs in their 
heads about how to be in control."19 These organizational rules to live by are 
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so basic, so underlying, that they are unconscious and unspoken. Basic under-
lying assumptions define "what to pay attention to, what things mean, how 
to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in various 
kinds of situations."2o 
The opening scenario illustrates the three levels of culture. During the 
surge, an underlying assumption was that technology is good. This assump-
tion leads to the norm of using technology whenever necessary to target 
combatants. The artifact is the firing of the Hellfire missile into the house con-
taining combatants. Mismatches between levels of culture offer a valuable 
metric for leaders. Artifacts representative of norms and values, and norms 
and values consistent with basic underlying assumptions, yield a consistency 
that reinforces and guides behaviors. For in extremis organizations and leaders, 
mismatches could produce a measure of indecisiveness that might result in 
unnecessary injuries and casualties. The Iraq story reflects what happens when 
the culture that a leader is trying to create is out of step with previous norms 
and values and basic underlying assumptions. 
John Kotter's Leading Change reinforces just how difficult it is to lead cul-
tural change.21 He argues that change "sticks" only after it becomes part of 
how the majority of people in the organization, about 75 percent or more, do 
business. Kotter suggests that lasting change will not occur "until new behav-
iors are rooted in social norms and shared values."22 Three factors weigh heav-
ily in such change: a conscious effort to demonstrate and model the new way 
of doing things, rewarding behaviors consistent with the new culture, and 
appointing leaders that embody the new culture. 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF CULTURAL CONCEPTS: 
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
For leaders and operators in dangerous contexts, the opening story illustrates 
how the demands of safety, complex ethical responsibilities, and the con-
sequences of action or inaction must be simultaneously weighed in a short, 
ultra-high-intensity time frame. To cultivate a culture of sound leadership for 
such contexts, one must examine the role of training. Training becomes the 
premium vehicle for not only promoting organizational change, but also for 
inculcating those changes into values and beliefs that influence the culture. 
It is the training of an organization's most precious assets-its people-that 
determines how they think, feel, and act while facing critical situations. 
It is within this framework that the Los Angeles Police Department began 
to examine traditional models of police training. As a practical matter, the 
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LAPD anticipated that it needed to adjust its policing for its force to adequately 
address the demands of future generations. Such a mental and cultural shift 
is easier said than done, however, particularly given the rich, tradition-based 
entities that police forces tend to be. It is not sufficient to simply add more 
training; it must be training that will shift thought processes so that a variety 
of new questions is asked. 
Techniques for Assessing Culture and Change 
Frequently, the inability of an organization to accept change is connected to 
a failure to adequately assess the cultures affected by the change. The formi-
dable social forces of formal and informal cultures can often block even the 
best initiatives. In the case of the LAPD, knowing that a solid understanding 
of the concerns from the frontline of policing would be critical, the principles 
of "leadership by walking around" were applied in numerous situations and 
by several different leaders in collaboration with one another.23 
Leadership by walking around was employed during the course of every-
day tasks. Various leaders in the training office looked for transitional oppor-
tunities to develop meaningful conversations, such as while officers were on 
break from a class, waiting in line for firearms qualification at the shooting 
range, training to hold a perimeter, or preparing for physical training. Running 
with classes of recruits allowed trainers to glean elements of accepted cul-
ture based on the recruits' chants. They also observed the use of positive 
and negative reinforcement by staff and noted the response to high and low 
achievement. 
LAPD leaders derived insights from walking around and paying atten-
tion to those who were" invisible" in the organization. This technique helped 
to include the perspective of the parking attendant, the records clerk, and the 
student workers and trainees. Focus groups alone would not have allowed 
these perspectives to surface. From the collection of observations through 
informal interactions, a framework, vocabulary, and subcultures were identi-
fied for examination through more formal assessment procedures. 
Army leaders likewise employ leadership by walking around as a tech-
nique for assessing culture. During such interactions, the leader exerts little 
direct influence because, for the most part, members of the unit are actually 
doing things properly. The leader exerts direct influence only on those parts 
of the organization that are not behaving in a manner consistent with cul-
tural norms and values. Put differently, the leader touches on, or uses "touch 
points," to correct aberrant behaviors.24 
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Although examining culture may seem unnecessary or labor intensive, to 
do otherwise is to invite failure. In the case of the LAPD police academy, the 
following six cultures or subcultures were examined: 
• current culture of the department 
• culture of the community being served 
• culture of the recruit 
• culture of the training instructors 
• culture of field training officers 
• the envisioned future culture 
More structured assessments were conducted through focus groups, dis-
cussions with key stakeholders, and a review of documentation and proce-
dures. Investigations revealed a myriad of issues that had to be accounted for 
in order to adequately address a redesigned training model. Generational dif-
ferences between recruits and senior officers proved significant. In contrast to 
their trainers, new recruits are "millennials,"who tend to have short and selec-
tive attention spans and operate with the expectation that information should 
be readily accessible. Tending toward nonconfrontation, millennials are "join-
ers" who want to be a part of something with a greater purpose, something 
larger than themselves. Given that this segment of the population represents 
the bulk of new trainees entering the LAPD police academy, two questions 
arose: "How do they learn?" and "How can they be reached?"The academy 
had been designed originally to meet the needs of a different kind of recruit, 
community, and environment. The LAPD had to thoroughly evaluate what 
training (and culture) needed to change in order to ensure success for the next 
generation of officers in a media-driven world of high expectations, incessant 
scrutiny, and constant demands. 
Similar to the military, traditional police training had typically emphasized 
pride, discipline, and performance. Police recruits sat at attention with min-
imal class discussion. Formal and informal instruction, including recruit-to-
recruit blogs and internet sites, told recruits to sit still, learn the material, and 
spout the textbook response. In essence, the mind-set required to succeed in 
the police academy was antithetical to the previous expectation of engage-
ment held by the community and officers in the field. 
The LAPD police academy aspired to do more than simply pass man-
dated state standards. Though it was determined that continuation of strong 
tactical training was necessary, improvements had to be made to encourage 
critical thinking and reward initiative. Training had to evolve so that new offi-
cers could be confident in their abilities to think through and master emergent 
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in extremis scenarios. The new goal was to complement tactical strengths by 
developing officers who were self-motivated, community-oriented critical 
thinkers and problem solvers. This revised goal demanded a new training par-
adigm and a new culture. 
THE LAPD POLICE ACADEMY TRAINING PARADIGM 
Part I: Peak Perfonnance by Training the Whole Person 
"Training the whole person" requires that all elements of the human condi-
tion be considered in the process in order to replicate the real-world polic-
ing environment. To reflect the shared importance of all aspects of a human 
response, the LAPD training triangle was created as a representation of all 
learning domains to be debriefed in training (see Figure 17.2): 
• affective domain, or emotions 
• cognitive domain, or thoughts 
• psychomotor domain, or behaviors 
The concept of developing the "whole person" is endemic to leadership 
paradigms and is rooted in the Army's "be-know-do"leadership development 
model. 25 
The challenge of LAPD police academy instructional teams was to ensure 
that each trainee gets pushed to deeper levels of skill acquisition. Training 
must mimic real life, which means that often one domain may be more dom-
inant than another. A significant shift in LAPD training culture was chang-
ing the definition of success from simply passing a cognitive test to one that 
involved all elements-emotions, behaviors, and thoughts--of a realistic 
training scenario. 
Though representative of a cultural shift for the law enforcement training 
community, these concepts are not new to those who study peak performance 
and sports psychology. Not having the advantage of classes full of highly disci-
plined, gifted athletes, the LAPD's aspiration was to get exceptional response 
capability out of normal people. This is where the potential of human motiva-
tion needs to be accessed the most, and this represents a significant contrast 
to the traditional police academy classroom, which involved instructor-to-
student lectures with little exchange between the two. The older approach did 
not reflect the dynamic, interactive nature of community policing, which val-
ues critical thinking and problem solving. The latter is the culture the LAPD 
police academy sought to create. 
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IN EXTREMIS CONTEXT 
FIGURE 17.2 Los Angeles Police Department police academy training model 
Older models for police training were focused primarily on training a skill 
set-typically represented by cognitive or psychomotor learning domains-
without much discussion of how an individual's affective state would influence 
either. The police academy wanted trained officers confident in their ability to 
assess and understand the role of emotion in human conflict. Consistent with 
Schein's notion of basic underlying assumptions, the new culture emphasized 
knowing, instead of ignoring, the affective component of training. 
The focal point for teaching affective responses is the LAPD's mission, 
vision, and values. These concepts represent the meaning of and motivation 
for why the LAPD does what it does. Acknowledging the numerous emotions 
experienced with policing, the department's mission, vision, and values help 
channel police officers' affective responses by causing them to consider what 
the response ought to be in a given scenario. 
Part II: Trained in a Team, by a Team, To Be a Team 
The LAPD police academy emphasizes that individuals are embedded in 
teams. It is not a trivial matter that the police academy's emphasis on team 
flies in the face of American society, which stresses individualism. Even the 
notion of the American Dream reinforces individuality by noting that the 
United States is a "land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for 
every man, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement."26 
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The deep roots of individuality point to the potential challenge and struggle 
of inculcating the value of teams in police academy training. This represents a 
foundational clash of underlying values and cultures. 
Solutions for in extremis events are more commonly team-based and 
involve a coordinated, collective action. Police forces dispatch their most elite 
teams to intervene in the most dangerous situations. Though respected for 
their individual skills, these teams are best known for their well-coordinated, 
synchronized efforts and movements. These teams are cross-trained for full 
awareness and appreciation of the complexity of each person's role. As Figure 
17.2 connotes, extensive team training is conducted in a continuous cycle. 
Strong teams require strong individuals, so remediation is done at both the 
micro (individual) and macro (team) levels of analysis. 
By deemphasizing individual grades and skills acquisition in the LAPD 
police academy, the organization leverages the social environment to create 
a different, more critical and more team-based, officer. The vision is that the 
organization will succeed or fail based on the aggregate performance of its 
coordinated teams. The intent is to create the building blocks for team collabo-
ration, roles, and responsibilities early in one's development as a police officer. 
Ultimately the LAPD of the future will reflect an interdependent organi-
zation that values teams for their specific functions and for their contribution 
to the force. Having officers train in teams creates ownership, responsibil-
ity, and a better awareness of how one team's response fits within the larger 
operational context. This creates a more resilient workforce. Research suggests 
that resiliency is increased when those exposed to life-threatening, in extremis 
environments feel an affinity for and social connection to colleagues in mean-
ingful ways.27 
Part III: The Context-Training through an Event. Not to It 
The final portion of the LAPD police academy model requires that the 
dynamic development of the individual and the team occurs within an expe-
rientialleaming environment. This necessitates officers training "through" an 
event and not to it. Training through an event includes training not only for 
the extreme event, but also for events following or preceding the crisis. The 
latter tend to encompass the preponderance of daily police work. 
Laudably, the law enforcement community spends significant training 
dollars preparing for in extremis events meant to test certain psychomotor 
(behavioral) capabilities. Often ignored, however, are the cognitive (thoughts) 
and affective (emotion) domains. After an in extremis event, it is incumbent 
on leaders to ensure that individuals, teams, and organizations return to 
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functioning at a neutral level. Cultivating a healthy police culture requires that 
officers return to functioning in the relative calm of more"normal" situations. 
This LAPD model incorporates many aspects of what is already known 
to cultivate resilience in those who chose the career path of a first responder. 
Taken as a whole, the model speaks to the deliberate, practical, and informed 
manner in which the LAPD has gone about the process of building a culture 
of policing based on the contribution of every individual as a leader and the 
value of every team in completing the mission. 
LEADER AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS: 
AN INTEGRATED ARMY (GREEN) AND LAPD (BLUE) PERSPECTIVE 
Envisioning and enacting a positive culture capable of sustaining high-level 
performance in extreme environments takes an enormous commitment of 
time and energy. While much has been written about culture or "command 
climate,"the pragmatic view suggests that complex written perspectives gen-
erally lose their luster in practice.28 This bias toward "doing"hints at the need 
to keep guidance regarding leadership and leadership development simple. 
Providing subordinates a general framework within which to work and allow-
ing them the freedom to innovate within that framework also fits within the 
broader American culture. What follows are tips about leading effectively in 
extreme situations. The intent is to offer a perspective that readers can use to 
develop their leadership style in the context of creating a sustainable organiza-
tional culture capable of winning during extreme circumstances. The insights 
apply to a leader's attempt to assess, discover, change, or transmit the appro-
priate culture. 
• Keep your command philosophy simple and pravide a framework for winning in 
extreme environments. Army commanders have traditionally been encour-
aged to publish a "command philosophy"upon assumption of their posi-
tion. Some command philosophies are several pages long, for example, 
ten single-spaced pages or more. The problem with this approach is that 
often the leader's words do not match subsequent actions. In Scheinian 
terms, a mismatch is created between espoused values-what the leader 
says-and actual behaviors-what the leader does. This disconnect 
between espoused values and basic underlying assumptions results in 
cynicism among organization members. 
• Get the big ideas right. Leadership is about getting the"big ideas"right.29 A 
small number of big ideas-modeled by the organizational leader every 
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day and copied by subordinates-are better than tenfold ideas published 
in an unread philosophical epic. Consider the following command philos-
ophy, a scant two sentences long: "Do the right thing" and "Treat others 
the way you want to be treated." Consider adding a qualifier at the end of 
the document and one has the essence of the philosophy: "You will learn 
more about me and my beliefs as we meet each other during the course of 
our operations and day-to-day life within the unit." 
• Lead by example in all things-and teach. Avoid the common misperception 
that leading by example simply means being the fastest or the strongest. 
Teaching is an indispensable part of being a leader-and never more so 
than in extreme environments. As Admiral James Bond Stockdale noted, 
"Every great leader I've ever known has been a great teacher, able to give 
those around him a sense of perspective .... Teachership is indispensable 
to leadership and an integral part of duty."30 This theme, that leadership is 
teachership, is essential in dangerous environments. 
• Seek personal balance in order to protect your ability to make decisions. Current 
literature cites balance as a critical element of holistic leadership.31 The 
notion is simple: do not ignore one's very real need to read, reflect, and 
rest. The organization depends on the individual and the collective abili-
ties of its leaders and members to make sound decisions, and sound deci-
sions are affected by one's emotional, physical, social, and spiritual health. 
To illustrate, General Douglas MacArthur is rumored to have never made 
a serious decision after 3 p.m., preferring instead to spend his evenings in 
quiet reflection and to postpone big decisions until the morning. 
• Periodically review your philosophy for subordinates. It is easy to get caught 
up in the gravitational pull of the day-to-day running of an organization. 
Take the larger organizational view. One should not assume that new 
members of the group will absorb leaders' beliefs or philosophy through 
osmosis. Much as big ships do not make sharp turns, it takes time and 
reinforcement to change organizational culture. Remember the opening 
story about Iraq? 
• Develop the ability and tacit knowledge to identify where you are needed and at 
the precise time you are needed. In Army parlance, the notion of being where 
needed most is known as the decisive point. The ability to identify the 
decisive point and to be present as necessary accrues through experience, 
training, and trial by fire. Leaders must be present and vigilant because 
even well-intentioned subordinates can get off track. Be mindful of 
this dynamic. 
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• Attend to all elements of extreme events, whether during training or real life. This 
chapter's opening story highlights how a given tactical situation can elicit 
numerous applicable solutions. Some solutions are consistent with and 
others are in opposition to the desired organizational culture. Although pre-
dictable in the Iraq situation as told, the responses of embarrassment and 
shame are emotions largely excluded from training development or tactical 
debriefs. If only tactical operations are debriefed, only tactical operations 
will be improved. In extremis events require leaders to attend to all facets of 
an operation. 
• Train the whole person. First responders to dangerous events, whether wars 
abroad or emergencies at home, are challenged in a number of ways. The 
challenges occur before, during, and after the events. These include battles 
for scarce resources, lack of support from senior leaders, and bureaucratic 
red tape to train for all elements of an operation. Organizations that fail to 
train the whole person and challenge their capabilities across all domains 
fail to adequately prepare team members for the totality of the experience. 
A best practice focused on training the whole person is a technique 
used by the German Army Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in Afghanistan.32 
In summer 2008, a German army military psychologist offered psycho-
logical education and mental training to the soldiers and leaders of a pla-
toon earmarked for duty with a second contingent of the QRF. Military 
psychologists in the German army work as consultants in psychological 
matters, preventive specialists focusing on post-traumatic stress disorder 
and other psychological outcomes, coordinators for after-care measures 
following critical incidents, and counselors for soldiers before, during, and 
after operations. 
This particular psychologist designed two instruments for psycholog-
ical self-assessments: (1) a self-check for mental readiness to engage in a 
fight-and-survive scenario and (2) a self-check for leadership and team 
capability during a fight. Instruction was provided regarding how to adapt 
to unusual, in extremis situations and how to adequately perform self-
checks for combat readiness. 
Results showed that 63 percent of participants felt better prepared 
for combat, and 86 percent acknowledged the utility of a self-check to 
make them more aware of combat stressors. Similarly, 90 percent of par-
ticipants fully agreed that mental preparation is necessary as a means of 
anticipating psychological stressors associated with combat operations. 
Researchers concluded that interventions by military psychologists paid 
huge dividends before, during, and after QRF missions. 
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• Train all the way through an event, not just to it. A derivative of the preced-
ing discussion is that events leading to a dangerous context and recovery 
from the actual event engender significant additional challenges. Leaders 
cannot stop leading once the tactical operation has concluded. Leaders 
must anticipate the ongoing needs of their people, consider the political 
environment and constructs within which operations are conducted, and 
acquire the resources needed after the extreme event. 
• Demonstrate righteous anger judiciously. The notion of losing one's tem-
per judiciously appears to be oxymoronic. Yet, this prescription is both 
interesting and supported by the leadership literature. Research shows 
that leaders only have so many silver bullets, and if fired all at once, the 
werewolves become immune. This is often referred to as the "silver bul-
let theory" of leadership, coined by former Stanford University president 
Donald Kennedy.33 
The argument here is not advocating behaving badly. Rather, the 
intent is to leverage the affective response of subordinates by judiciously 
using anger as a motivator. Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie 
McKee suggest this approach in Primal Leadership. They argue that this 
commanding style should be part of a leader's repertoire and is best used 
"in a crisis, to kick-start a turnaround, or with problem employees."34 
In Sacred Hoops, the basketball coach Phil Jackson speaks about 
"righteous anger" and how to deliver it. He states, "As a rule I try not to 
unleash my anger at players ... . When it happens, I say what I have to say, 
then let it pass, so the bad feelings won't linger in the air and poison the 
team. Sometimes what my father called'righteous anger'is the most skill-
ful means to shake up a team. But, it has to be dispensed judiciously."35 
Jackson's points are reinforced by research suggesting that "emotional 
arousal in moderation may also have a positive impact on human learn-
ing."36 Admiral Stockdale supports Jackson's contention: "Every so often, I 
would play that'irrational'role and come completely unglued" in order to 
stimulate the desired arousal in subordinates.37 His point: being theatrical 
at the right time really helped him during his in extremis imprisonment in 
the Hanoi Hilton. 
• Link mission, vision, and values, and make them meaningful. Full com-
mitment is necessary for success in extreme environments, and for human 
beings, commitment is linked to meaning. Hence, the values and vision 
of an organization must be devised, communicated, and reinforced in a 
manner that stimulates full commitment to accomplishing the organiza-
tional mission. These are essential tasks for creating the desired culture. 
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Napoleon warns leaders that this sort of commitment cannot be 
bought and is not for sale. He cautions, "A man does not have himself 
killed for a half-pence a day or for a petty distinction. You must speak to 
the soul in order to electrify him."38 Stockdale agrees: "More than any 
other factor ... success or failure depends on the moral sentiment, the 
ethos, the spirit of the man."39 
In extreme environments, the binding force of individual commit-
ment is manifested by unit cohesion. Cohesiveness of the variety required 
to succeed in extremis is derived from membership in a team of profes-
sionals fully committed to subjugating one's needs for the good of the 
team. Membership in such teams must be earned, standards must be high 
and consistently enforced, and there must exist overarching meaning of 
the rarest form. In these environs, leadership is as much about communi-
cating meaning as it is anything else.40 
Conduct training in teams by teams early. A well-established body of soci-
ological literature demonstrates that human beings endure and operate 
in extreme conditions essentially for each other. S. 1. A. Marshall's Men 
against Fire (1947), Morris Janowitz and Edward A. Shils' classic "Cohesion 
and Disintegration of the German Wehrmacht in World War II" (1948), 
Samuel Stouffer's American Soldier (1949), and Charles Moskos"'Why Men 
Fight" (1969) equally contend that trust in and overriding commitment to 
the team serves as the tonic that keeps soldiers fighting in combat. 
The same motivational foundation applies to first responders. 
Evidence suggests that identification with one's team, the cohesiveness of 
the team, and the team's commitment to organizational goals are linked 
with successful functioning in extreme environments. For these reasons, 
it makes sense to form teams early and to conduct training in teams in 
order to bind individuals into an identifiable, functional collective. 
Seek continuous improvement. The literature on "learning organizations" 
also applies to organizations operating in extremis.41 Seeking continuous 
improvement implies double-loop learning, which Argyris describes as 
learning that changes the system. This involves unlearning old ways of 
doing business and continually seeking new ways to operate. A culture of 
continuous improvement is necessitated by the enormity of the dangers 
and risks associated with operating in extreme environments and by the 
ingenuity of the opposition. 
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